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Enforcing the U.S. Trafficking Victims
Protection Act in Emerging Markets: The
Challenge of Affecting Change in
India and China
Mary Catherine Hendrixt
[M]illions of our fellow human beings . . . live as contemporary slaves,
victims of abominable practices like human trafficking, forced labour and sexual
exploitation.... The fact that these atrocities take place in today's world should
fill us all with shame. The realization that, in many instances, such practices
are sanctioned, supported or ignored by those with the power and the responsi-
bility to end them should lead us to outrage. But, above all else, the needs of the
enslaved must inspire us to action. 1
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Introduction
Sixteen-year-old Shen left his small Chinese farming community for
the promise of a well-paying job in a nearby city. 2 He was then abducted
and taken to a brickyard where he was beaten repeatedly with iron bars
and bricks, starved, and forced to perform heavy manual labor for twenty
hours per day.3 Shanti, a ten-year-old girl from Rajasthan, India, was traf-
ficked to Bombay where she was beaten and forced to beg on the street for
fifteen hours a day.4 She was not allowed to bathe and was only allowed
one meal per day, so her emaciated frame would help her attract more
money while begging.5 In Phoenix, Arizona, fifteen-year-old Debbie was
abducted from her own driveway, threatened and gang-raped by her cap-
tors, advertised as a prostitute on the Internet and sold for sex repeatedly
for more than forty days.6
These stories, though shocking, are not unique. Human trafficking,
the movement of persons across and within national boundaries for the
purpose of coercing those persons to perform exploitive labor, including
sex work,7 affects every country around the globe.8 It is "considered to be
one of today's leading criminal enterprises" 9 and has reached "epidemic
proportions," with an annual global market of about $42.5 billion. 10 The
U.S. government estimates that two to four million people per year are traf-
2. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 8 (2008), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/105501.pdf [hereinafter TIP REPORT].
3. Id.
4. Id. at 10.
5. Id.
6. Teen Girls'Stories of Sex Trafficking in U.S., ABC NEws, Feb. 9, 2006, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/Story?id=1596778&page=1.
7. SeeJennifer M. Chacon, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of the U.S.
Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAm L. REV. 2977, 2981 (2006).
8. See LIANA SUN WYLER, ALISON SISKIN & CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: U.S. POLICY AND ISSUES FOR CON-
GRESS 3 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34317.pdf [hereinafter
REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS].
9. Id. at 2.
10. Council of Europe Says Human Trafficking Has Reached 'Epidemic Proportions,' THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5, 2006 [hereinafter Epidemic Proportions].
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ficked domestically and across national borders."
In recent years, there has been an international outcry 12 to stop this
modern form of slavery and for countries around the world to "combat
poverty, social exclusion, illiteracy, ignorance and discrimination, which
increase vulnerability and are part of the underlying context for this
scourge."'1 3 In the United States and abroad, news media have focused
their attention on human trafficking, and the reports are shocking coun-
tries into action. 14
To address the global human trafficking problem, the United Nations
member states adopted the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traf-
ficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(Palermo Protocol), by resolution on November 15, 2000.15 Parties to the
Palermo Protocol agreed to prosecute traffickers, protect trafficking vic-
tims, and cooperate with other countries to eliminate human trafficking.16
As is the case with many international laws, critics of the Palermo Protocol
feel that it lacks adequate enforcement measures.1 7
Thousands of people are trafficked into the United States each year for
the purposes of forced labor and sexual servitude. 18 In response to the
growing human trafficking problem, the United States promulgated a com-
11. See REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 8, at 2. But see
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and
Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad, GAO-06-825, at 2 (July
2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06825.pdf [hereinafter GAO
Report] (stating that there is some doubt as to the reliability of these estimates due to
methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and numerical discrepancies).
12. See Mohamed Y. Mattar, Trafficking in Persons: An Annotated Legal Bibliography,
96 LAW LIBR. J. 669, 670 (2004); see also Alexandra Amiel, Integrating a Human Rights
Perspective Into the European Approach to Combating the Trafficking of Women for Sexual
Exploitation, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 5, 6 (2006).
13. The Secretary-General, Secretary-General Underlines Need For Zero Tolerance in
Message to Observe International Day For Abolition of Slavery, t 4, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/
10223 (November 21, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/
sgsm10223.doc.htm.
14. See Developments in the Law: Jobs and Borders, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2171, 2181
(2005) (discussing the media attention garnered by the "Deaf Mexican" case and a case
of Thai nationals being forced to work in a guarded, barbed-wired factory) [hereinafter
Developments]; see also Sonia Merzon, Note, Extraterritorial Reach of the Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Act, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 887, 887 (2007) (highlighting the U.S.
Department of State's dedication of the TIP Report to a thirteen-year-old sex trafficking
victim whose captors escaped just before being prosecuted).
15. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15,
2000), available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/docs/
Background%20documents/Firearms%2OProtocol%20-%20E.pdf [hereinafter Palermo
Protocol].
16. Id.
17. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2001).
18. See TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
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prehensive domestic law to combat trafficking in persons. 19 The Traffick-
ing Victims Protection Act (TVPA), signed into law on October 28, 2000,
focuses on the protection of trafficking victims, the prosecution of those
persons trafficking in human beings, and the prevention of human traffick-
ing.20 The TVPA comprehensively addresses anti-trafficking efforts domes-
tically, and it also reaches beyond the United States and affects anti-
trafficking efforts abroad. 2 1
It is still unclear, however, whether the TVPA is effective in changing
human trafficking in other countries.2 2 The law includes a complex rank-
ing system, with the worst ranked countries subject to non-humanitarian,
non-trade related foreign assistance sanctions from the United States.
23
This Note argues that India and the People's Republic of China (China),
both of which have been ranked on a special "Watch List" for several
years, 24 illustrate the ineffectiveness of the TVPA's enforcement mecha-
nisms. Both India and China are source, destination, and transit countries
for victims of human trafficking, and their severe and widespread traffick-
ing problems affect millions of people. 25 While the United States is aware
of the severe human rights violations occurring in both countries, often
with the complicity of the local police and governmental officials,26 it has
been unable to compel the countries to improve enough to move from the
Watch List. This Note argues that this failure to influence change is illus-
trative of a larger problem in the TVPA's ability to affect countries that are
emerging markets and are important to the United States' economic inter-
ests, and signals the need for new legal enforcement measures.
19. See Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff. Using Unilateral Sanctions
to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 437, 439 (2006) (stating that the TVPA
has teeth that the international law lacks).
20. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 106-386
§§ 106-108, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466 (2000) (amended 2008) [hereinafter TVPA]. The
abbreviation TVPA is also used in connection with a separate statute, the Torture Vic-
tims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991). It is used here, however,
to refer only to the trafficking statute.
21. See TVPA §§ 106-108.
22. See Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Domestic and International Impact of the U.S. Vic-
tims of Trafficking Protection Act of 2000: Does Law Deter Crime?, 2 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L.
REV. 193, 206-16 (2005).
23. TVPA § 110(d)(1).
24. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 91, 139.
25. See id. at 91-92, 139 (citing the "enormous size of [China's] trafficking problem
and estimating that India's bonded labor problem affects 20 to 65 million Indians");
Combating Human Trafficking in China: Domestic and International Efforts: Hearing Before
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (opening state-
ment of Hon. Chuck Hagel, Chairman, Cong.-Exec. Commission on China) (stating that
human trafficking in China is a serious problem and that estimates from 2002 show
that there were about 250,000 victims of human trafficking in China).
26. See SUSAN DEwEY, HOLLow BODIES: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO SEX TRAFFICKING
IN ARMENIA, BOSNIA, AND INDIA 133 (2008) (describing the weekly bribes paid to local
police officers in Bombay's red light district); see also TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 92
(stating that there is a "significant level of corruption and complicity in trafficking by
some local government officials" in China).
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Part I of this Note summarizes the international problem of human
trafficking and the related international treaty regime. Part II explores the
United States' response to human trafficking in the TVPA and its goal of
affecting human trafficking domestically and internationally. Part III dis-
cusses the human trafficking problems in India and China, the domestic
laws their governments have promulgated, and the United States' response
to those human trafficking standards. Part IV explores the problems with
the TVPA enforcement techniques generally and argues that the traditional
threat of sanctions and reliance on naming and shaming are especially inef-
fective with respect to countries like India and China. Part IV also dis-
cusses possible solutions and proposes that the United States could
narrow the waiver provision in the TVPA, focus on a new regime for sham-
ing noncompliant countries, concentrate more on victim protection, or
push for more enforcement to come from the Palermo Protocol through a
designated central agency. This Note concludes that the most viable
option is for the United States to revise its ranking regime and create a
structure of naming and shaming with consequences to countries that turn
a blind eye to human trafficking.
I. The Worldwide Epidemic of Human Trafficking and the
Multilateral Response
A. The International Scope of Human Trafficking
Human trafficking has reached "epidemic proportions," with the U.S.
government estimating that between 600,000 and 800,000 people are traf-
ficked across borders annually. 2 7 When trafficking within countries is
included, the estimate rises to two to four million people trafficked each
year. 28 It has a global annual market of about $42.5 billion, 29 and is "con-
sidered to be one of today's leading criminal enterprises. '30 The Interna-
tional Labor Organization estimates that 2.4 million of the 12.3 million
people who are victims of forced labor have been trafficked, 3 1 and the
majority of those trafficking victims are women and children. 3 2
It should be noted that there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the
U.S. statistics, as well as to other international human trafficking statis-
tics. 33 For example, obtaining an accurate estimate is difficult because
there is an obvious gap between the number of rescued victims of human
trafficking, who form the basis for the statistical data, and the total num-
27. See REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 8, at 2.
28. Id.
29. See Epidemic Proportions, supra note 10.
30. REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 8, at 2.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME (UNODC), GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICK-
ING IN PERSONS 48 (2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-traf-
ficking/GlobalReport -on -TIP.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL REPORT] (finding that sixty-six
percent of the reported victims were women and twenty-two percent were children).
33. See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 11, at 2-3 (stating that there is some doubt as
to the reliability of these estimates due to methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and
numerical discrepancies).
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ber of trafficking victims in existence.3 4 Human trafficking is an illegal
act, and its clandestine nature makes it difficult to collect accurate statis-
tics about its prevalence. 3 5 Many victims of trafficking do not come for-
ward for fear of retaliation from traffickers or legal authorities.3 6 Also,
many countries do not have laws against human trafficking, and if laws do
exist, they differ as to the definition of human trafficking.3 7 This leads to
problems with identification of victims, as many victims are considered by
the governments to be smuggled migrants instead of victims of traffick-
ing.3 8 Furthermore, many governments fail to collect data on the preva-
lence of human trafficking and would find they lack the requisite
centralized agency or coordinated statistical system to do so. 3 9 But, as
stated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "[a] strict focus
on numbers can distract from the ultimate purpose of anti-human traffick-
ing efforts, which must be to end, not reduce, this practice."40 While the
United Nations and its members, especially the United States, are working
to develop a mechanism that would give a reliable global trafficking esti-
mate, they are focusing most of their efforts on stopping human trafficking
altogether. 4 1
Human trafficking is a global problem that affects every country in
our international community.4 2 It generally flows from less developed
countries to more industrialized nations or to neighboring countries with
higher standards of living.4 3 For some countries, human trafficking is a
cornerstone of the economy.44 In Thailand, for example, the sale of
women and girls into sex work is a staple of the tourism industry. 45
There are two typical scenarios in human trafficking. The first is
when an individual is taken by force, often abducted, drugged, or sold to
the trafficker. 46 The second and more common scenario is when an indi-
vidual is deceived by the promise of a better life and accepts a job only to
find out later that the actual conditions and employment are not as prom-
34. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS:
GLOBAL PATTERNS 43 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/traffickinginper-
sons report 2006ver2.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL PATTERNS].
35. VIDYAMALI SAMARASINGHE, FEMALE SEX TRAFFICKING IN ASIA: THE RESILIENCE OF
PATRIARCHY IN A CHANGING WORLD 16 (Janet Henshall Momsen & Janice Monk eds.,
2008).
36. GLOBAL PATTERNS, supra note 34, at 44.
37. Id.
38. See SAMARASINGHE, supra note 35, at 16 (describing the inherent problems of con-
ceptual and practical identification of victims of human trafficking); see also, GLOBAL
REPORT, supra note 32, at 51 (stating that victims of human trafficking may be seen as
smuggled migrants rather than victims).
39. See GLOBAL PATTERNS, supra note 34, at 44 (noting that in countries that lack a
centralized agency, any data collection that is actually done, is done on an ad hoc basis).
40. Id. at 45.
41. Id.
42. REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 8, at 1.
43. Id. at 4.
44. See Developments, supra note 14, at 2186.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2184.
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ised.4 7 While each case of human trafficking is different, most people,
after being abducted or recruited from their country of origin, are trans-
ferred through a transit region, and then exploited in the destination coun-
try.48 While this is typical, movement of the victim is not required for the
crime to be one of human trafficking.4 9
Human trafficking includes both sexual exploitation and forced
labor.5 0 The major forms of sexual exploitation as characterized by the
TVPA include sex trafficking and prostitution, child exploitation for com-
mercial sex, and child sex tourism.5 1 While there is a heated debate over
whether voluntary adult prostitution constitutes trafficking, it is clearly
agreed that forced prostitution does.5 2 There is also a huge problem with
the sexual exploitation of children. 53 More than two million children are
exploited in the global commercial sex trade every year, and there is a large
market for travel from one country to another to engage in commercial sex
with children.5 4
The major forms of forced labor, according to the TVPA, are bonded
labor, debt bondage and involuntary servitude among migrant laborers,
involuntary domestic servitude, forced child labor, and child soldiers. 55
Bonded labor occurs when a trafficker uses a debt to subjugate a person.5 6
Often, traffickers exploit a perceived debt incurred up front and force the
victim to work until they are able to pay it off. 57 For example, in South
Asia, it is common for an indigent person to borrow money and agree to
pay back the debt through labor. 58 The debtors are unable to repay the
growing debt and their children are subsequently born into debt as well,
creating generations of enslaved laborers.5 9
While sex trafficking accounts for a substantial amount of the overall
human trafficking problem and garners most of the international discus-
sion and media attention, the international community should not ignore
the severe problem of forced labor.60 Unfortunately, many of the countries
that have domestic anti-trafficking legislation do not even consider forced
labor to be human trafficking.6 1 Instead, forced labor is sometimes seen as
47. Id. at 2184-85.
48. See, e.g., GLOBAL PATTERNS, supra note 34, at 57.
49. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id. at 23-25.
52. Chuang, supra note 19, at 442-43 (discussing the differing views of "abolition-
ists" who feel that prostitution is inherently exploitive and those who believe that
women may make an economic choice to do sex work).
53. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 18-23.
56. Id. at 19.
57. Id.
58. Merzon, supra note 14, at 890.
59. Id.
60. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 23; GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 66 (discussing
the preference of the media for stories about sexual exploitation over those about forced
labor).
61. GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 65-66.
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an issue for trade unions or labor regulations. 62 However, both the TVPA
and the Palermo Protocol regard forced labor as illegal human
trafficking.63
Human trafficking imposes both human and societal costs. 6 4 The vic-
tims suffer from physical and psychological injuries even if they are fortu-
nate enough to be rescued. 65 Often, inhumane living conditions cause the
trafficking victims to contract illnesses that may spread to other people in
the community.66 Similarly, the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS is particu-
larly high among trafficking victims of sexual exploitation because they are
forced to have unprotected sex with customers and are denied proper
healthcare. 67 In terms of societal costs, human trafficking "leads to the
perpetuation of crime and corruption" by funding global criminal organi-
zations and suppressing the workforce in a way that reinforces the cycle of
poverty.68
B. The International Community Responds with the Palermo Protocol
In response to the international human trafficking problem, con-
cerned states began to meet in 1999 to draft the Palermo Protocol. 69 The
Palermo Protocol was adopted by resolution on November 15, 2000,70 and
was ratified by enough countries to enter into force on December 25,
2003. 7 1 There are currently 117 signatories and 124 parties to the Proto-
col, including the United States. 72 The purpose of the Palermo Protocol
was to create a framework through which countries could work together to
fight human trafficking. 73 Parties to the Protocol agree to prevent and
combat human trafficking, to protect trafficking victims, and to cooperate
with other countries to eliminate human trafficking.74
During the drafting of the Palermo Protocol, there were heated debates
over definitions of related terms and frameworks to address the global
human trafficking problem.75 The debates centered on the issue of
whether the legal definition of "trafficking in persons" should include vol-
untary prostitution.76 To reach a consensus, the states eventually agreed to
62. Id. at 66.
63. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 19; Palermo Protocol, supra note 15, art. 3.
64. Merzon, supra note 14, at 890.
65. Id. at 890-91.
66. Developments, supra note 14 at 2186.
67. Id.
68. Merzon, supra note 14, at 891.
69. REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 8, at 13.
70. Palermo Protocol, supra note 15.
71. Chuang, supra note 19, at 442.
72. Palermo Protocol, supra note 15, pmbl.; see also List of Signatories and Parties to
the Palermo Protocol, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/countrylist-
traffickingprotocol.html.
73. See REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 8, at 13.
74. Palermo Protocol, supra note 15, art. 2.
75. Chuang, supra note 19, at 438; see also Kara Abramson, Note, Beyond Consent,
Toward Safeguarding Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations Trafficking Protocol,
44 HARv. INT'L L. J. 473, 473 (2003).
76. Chuang, supra note 19, at 443-44.
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leave these contested issues to state discretion.
7 7
The drafters of the Palermo Protocol settled on the following defini-
tion of trafficking:
"Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of pay-
ments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include,
at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs78
Following that definition, the Protocol addresses the issue of consent
and determines that a person who consents to migrate can still be consid-
ered trafficked. 79 A person is considered to be trafficked if his or her acts
were carried out because of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, or by abduction, deception or abuse of another person's position
of power, or the exploitation of the victim's position of vulnerability. 80
In achieving the main objectives of punishing the traffickers, protect-
ing the victims, and preventing the crime of trafficking, the Protocol
requires that parties take certain actions. To punish traffickers, the parties
to the Protocol are required to adopt legislative measures that criminalize
human trafficking.8 1 The legislation must cover persons intentionally
committing, or attempting to commit, the prohibited acts, including accom-
plices and those involved in organizing or directing others in human
trafficking.8 2
To protect victims of trafficking, state parties must protect the privacy
and identity of trafficking victims and must consider providing assistance
for physical, psychological, and social recovery of the trafficking victims.
8 3
They also must endeavor to protect the physical safety of victims within
their territory and ensure that their domestic legal system offers compensa-
tion for victims' suffering.8 4 The Protocol further asks that state parties
consider adopting legislation that allows victims to remain in the country,
or, in the alternative, the state party must determine where the victim is a
national and repatriate them safely and without undue delay. 85
To meet the objective of preventing human trafficking, state parties
must establish policies, programs, and procedures aimed at prevention,
such as conducting related research, distributing information, conducting
77. Id. at 438-39.
78. Palermo Protocol, supra note 15, art. 3(a).
79. See GLOBAL PATTERNS, supra note 34, at 51.
80. See Abramson, supra note 75 at 476-77; see also GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 32,
at 51 (noting that children under the age of eighteen cannot give consent).
81. Palermo Protocol, supra note 15, art. 5(1).
82. Id. art. 5(2).
83. Id. art. 6(3).
84. Id. arts. 6(5)-(6).
85. Id. arts. 8(1)-(4).
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media campaigns, and undertaking economic initiatives to combat human
trafficking.86 The Palermo Protocol also calls on state parties to take mea-
sures aimed at factors that are thought to increase a person's vulnerability
to trafficking, such as poverty and lack of equal opportunity. 87 Further-
more, state parties must address the demand for trafficked persons that
makes the sale of human beings a profitable industry for the traffickers.,8
Parties to the Protocol are expected to work together and exchange infor-
mation; they are required to provide training for law enforcement and other
officials involved in the prevention of human trafficking, prosecution of
traffickers, and protection of trafficking victims.89
C. Problems with the Palermo Protocol
Even though the Palermo Protocol successfully established a frame-
work for addressing international human trafficking, many objections to
the Protocol quickly arose. 90 As is the case with many international laws,
critics of the Palermo Protocol feel that it lacks adequate enforcement capa-
bilities.91 Currently, there are no mechanisms in place to determine
whether state parties have properly implemented the Protocol. This
absence of oversight leaves the Protocol without the power to monitor
whether state parties are adhering to its provisions and to enforce them if
they are not.92 Where the Protocol has been implemented, critics say it
only focuses on human trafficking situations that are related to organized
crime and cross-border migrations, ignoring the magnitude of other human
trafficking situations. 93
The Palermo Protocol also has been widely criticized from a human
rights perspective. Human rights advocates are concerned about the
emphasis placed on prosecution and possible disregard for the human
rights of the victims. 94 These human rights issues did not receive the
attention in the Protocol that the advocates hoped; to the extent that
human rights are addressed at all, they are mostly described as something
the state parties should try to do, rather than concrete obligations for all
members of the Protocol. 95
Additionally, critics have called attention to the Protocol's requirement
86. Id. arts. 9(1)-(2).
87. Id. art. 9(4).
88. Id. art. 9(5).
89. Id. art. 10.
90. Chuang, supra note 19, at 448.
91. See id. at 439 (stating that the TVPA has teeth that the international law lacks).
92. See REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 8, at 15; see also
Alice Edwards, Traffic in Human Beings: At the Intersection of Criminal Justice, Human
Rights, Asylum/Migration and Labor, 36 DENy. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 9, 52 (2007) (noting
that a lack of effective oversight and enforcement capabilities in international human
trafficking instruments lead implementations to be weak).
93. SAMARASINGHE, supra note 35, at 22.
94. Id.; see also Chuang, supra note 19, at 447 (stating that human rights advocates
tried to convince drafters that human rights protections were integral to crime and bor-
der control objectives).
95. See Chuang, supra note 19, at 448.
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that trafficking victims become informants to the police.96 If they do not
become informants, they are often "treated as illegal immigrants and
criminals, and as threats to national security";9 7 if they do cooperate with
the authorities, the victims often find the criminal proceedings to merely be
a "stay of deportation," and they are quickly deported when their help is
no longer needed.9 8 Victims who are repatriated face the shame and
humiliation of being deported, fear of reprisal from traffickers, and stigma
in their home communities.9 9 For example, Nepali women rescued from
human trafficking situations in India are often required to go to special
homes upon their return to the country because they are stigmatized and
unable to return to their former communities.' 0 0 These victims are
returned to the same, or worse, conditions than those from which they
originally fled, and thus are made vulnerable to re-trafficking.1 0 1
II. The United States Responds with the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act
Thousands of people are trafficked into the United States each year for
the purposes of sexual and labor exploitation. 10 2 They are trafficked
largely from East Asia, Mexico, and Central America, and many are
attracted by fraudulent offers of employment and then subject to debt
bondage or work in the commercial sex trade. 10 3
Two high-profile U.S. cases of human trafficking in the 1990s height-
ened public awareness of the problem and pushed the United States to take
domestic action. 104 First, in 1995, a police raid of a garment factory in El
Monte, California, uncovered Thai nationals being forced to work in slave-
like conditions.' 0 5 The seventy-two rescued workers had been promised
jobs in the United States, but when they arrived they were confined to the
compound and threatened with physical harm to themselves and their fam-
ilies if they did not comply. 10 6 They were forced to work for less than sixty
cents per hour for up to eighteen hours a day, seven days per week. 10 7
Second, in 1997, the New York City Police Department discovered a human
trafficking ring in which as many as sixty-two deaf-mute Mexican nationals
were forced to peddle trinkets in the New York City subways for twelve to
96. Kamala Kempadoo, From Moral Panic to Global Justice: Changing Perspectives on
Trafficking, in TRAFFICKING AND PROSTITUTION RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRA-
TION, SEX WoRK, AND HuMAN RIGHTS vii, xv (Kamala Kempadoo ed., 2005).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at xv-xvi.
101. Id. at xvi-xvii.
102. See TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
103. Id.
104. Chac6n, supra note 7, at 2987-89; see also Developments, supra note 14, at
2180-82.
105. See Chac6n, supra note 7, at 2987.
106. Developments, supra note 14, at 2182.
107. Chac6n, supra note 7, at 2987. But see Developments, supra note 14, at 2182
(citing that the workers were forced to work for seventeen hours per day).
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eighteen hours per day, seven days per week, with two days off every other
month. 10 8 The workers were forced to turn over all their earnings to their
traffickers and were physically and sexually abused. 10 9 They too were
lured to the United States by promises of a good job and a better life. 110
In the aftermath of these highly publicized stories, the United States
took action to deal with human trafficking domestically, as well as abroad.
The United States promulgated its first comprehensive domestic legislation
to combat human trafficking, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA). 111
A. Understanding the Goals and Structure of the TVPA
President Clinton signed the TVPA into law on October 28, 2000.112
Both the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, which
was signed into law on December 19, 2003,113 and the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, which was signed into law on Jan-
uary 10, 2006,114 supplemented the TVPA. Most recently, the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2008 (TVPRA 2008), which was signed into law
on December 23, 2008115 amended the TVPA. The TVPA's purpose is "to
combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery
whose victims are predominately women and children, to ensure just and
effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims."1 16
Using the "three P's" structure of protection of trafficking victims,
prosecution of those persons trafficking in human beings, and prevention
of human trafficking, the TVPA provides innovative measures for eliminat-
ing human trafficking. 1 17 It sets "minimum standards for the elimination
of trafficking" applicable to governments of countries that are places of
"origin, transit, or destination for a significant number of victims of severe
108. There is some confusion over how many Mexican nations were trafficked in this
scheme. See Chac6n, supra note 7, at 2987 (citing the number as "as many as sixty-
two"). But see Developments, supra note 14, at 2181 (stating that "police discovered fifty-
seven of these recruits"); see also Mark Fineman, Deaf Migrants' Families Had Feared
Abuse, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at Al; Deborah Sontag, Poor and Deaf From Mexico
Betrayed in Their Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1997, at Al.
109. Sontag, supra note 108, at Al.
110. Id.
111. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386 §§ 106-108, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466.
112. Id. §§ 106-108; Chac6n, supra note 7, at 2989.
113. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (amended 2005, 2008).
114. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-164, 119 Stat. 3558.
115. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 [hereinafter TVPRA 2008]. The Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008 was passed after the original writing of this article so its
provisions are not addressed in full detail. The Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008 was passed after the original writing of this article so its
provisions are not addressed in full detail.
116. TVPA § 102, 114 Stat. 1464 at 1466.
117. Chuang, supra note 19, at 450.
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trafficking."' 18 Under these standards, the governments of such countries
must "prohibit severe forms of trafficking in persons and punish acts of
such trafficking."' 19 The punishment for human trafficking must be com-
mensurate with punishment for other serious crimes and must be stringent
enough to deter those acts. 120 Additionally, the government "should make
serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in
persons."1 2 1 These measures include: investigating and prosecuting traf-
fickers, protecting victims and encouraging them to cooperate with the
investigation, informing and educating the public, cooperating with other
governments to investigate and prosecute severe forms of trafficking, extra-
diting persons charged with trafficking, monitoring immigration patterns,
and investigating and prosecuting public officials who participate in or
facilitate human trafficking. 12 2
The TVPA also addresses many of the issues that critics have lodged
against the Palermo Protocol. First, it takes the human rights aspirations
from the Protocol and turns them into hard obligations that governments
are required to meet. 123 To deal with the problems that trafficking victims
often face when deported back to their countries of origin, the TVPA pro-
vides the possibility of temporary or permanent resident status if the vic-
tims cooperate with prosecution efforts.1 24 It also allows for trafficking
victims to receive federal public assistance benefits. 12 5 For the victims that
do return to their countries of origin, the TVPA requires that there be "pro-
grams and initiatives in foreign countries to assist in the safe integration,
reintegration, or resettlement, as appropriate, of victims of trafficking." 126
The TVPA also criminalizes trafficking related acts, such as obtaining
labor or services through threats of physical harm, abuse or restraint, or
benefiting financially from such coerced labor. 127 In this way, the TVPA
targets the profitability of human trafficking. 12s It also provides a method
to determine whether countries are meeting the minimum standards 129
and employs a sanctions regime for those countries that do not comply or
attempt to comply. 1 30
B. Exploring the Tier System
The TVPA requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to
Congress describing the efforts taken by foreign governments to eliminate
118. TVPA § 108(a), 114 Stat. 1464 at 1480.
119. Id. § 108(a)(1).
120. Id. §§ 108(a)(2)-(3).
121. Id. § 108(a)(4).
122. Id. §§ 108(b)(1)-(7).
123. Chuang, supra note 19, at 451.
124. TVPA §§ 106-108, 114 Stat. 1464, 1476.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 107(a)(1).
127. Id. §112
128. Chuang, supra note 19, at 450-51.
129. TVPA § 108, 114 Stat. 1464, 1482 (requiring that a report be submitted to Con-
gress annually about the status of human trafficking in other countries).
130. Id. § 110 (d)(1).
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human trafficking.' 31 The Trafficking in Persons Report (the TIP Report)
is "the most comprehensive worldwide report on the efforts of govern-
ments to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons." 132 The countries
assessed in the Report are those determined to be countries of origin,
transit or destination in human trafficking, and the Report contains narra-
tives about each one, including information about the scope and nature of
the problem and the government's efforts to eliminate trafficking. 133
Based on those assessments, the U.S. State Department (the Depart-
ment) places countries into categories of Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 2 Watch List,
or Tier 3.134 To categorize a country, the Department first assesses the
government's adherence to the TVPA's minimum standards for the elimina-
tion of trafficking.135 If the government of a country fully complies with
the minimum standards, that country is placed in Tier 1.136 If a govern-
ment does not fully comply, the Department considers whether the govern-
ment is making significant efforts to comply. 13 7 It also considers the extent
of the human trafficking problem in the country, the extent of the noncom-
pliance with the minimum standards, and the resources and capabilities of
the government to address and eliminate human trafficking. 138 Countries
that do not currently comply with minimum standards but that are making
significant efforts to comply are placed in Tier 2.139 The Department
places countries that are noncompliant with the minimum standards and
not making an effort to comply in Tier 3.140 Finally, the Department con-
siders the Special Watch List criteria and determines whether Tier 2 coun-
tries should be placed on the Tier 2 Watch List. 141 Specifically, the list is
composed of three types of countries: (1) countries where the number of
trafficking victims is very significant or is significantly increasing; (2)
countries whose governments are failing to show increased efforts to com-
bat trafficking from the previous year; or (3) countries that are on the Tier
2 list, instead of Tier 3, because they committed to make efforts to comply
with minimum standards over the next year. 142 Recently, as part of the
TVPRA 2008, Congress amended the TVPA to say that if a county has been
on the Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive years, it will then be ranked in
Tier 3, unless the President waives the standard. 143
131. Id. § 110 (b)(1)
132. Id. § 110; see also TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
133. TVPA § 1 10(b)(3), 114 Stat. 1464, 1482; see also TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
134. See TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-12 (describing the methodologies to placing
countries in the tier categories).
135. TVPA § 108, 114 Stat. 1464, 1480; see also TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
136. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 11.
139. Id. at 12.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 12-13.
143. See TVPRA 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457 § 107, 122 Stat. 5044. Since this change
will not take effect until the 2009 TIP Report, its efficacy will be unknown for several
years.
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In the 2008 TIP Report 144 there are twenty-nine countries on the Tier
1 list, seventy countries on the Tier 2 list, forty countries on the Tier 2
Watch List, and fourteen countries on the Tier 3 list.1 45 Many of the coun-
tries on the Tier 2 Watch List have been listed there for two years or
more. 146 Countries that are not included in the report are still likely to
have trafficking problems because the effects of human trafficking reach
every country in the world; they are not included due to a lack of adequate
information. 147
C. Enforcing the TVPA with Economic Sanctions
Under the TVPA, the U.S. government has the power to institute sanc-
tions on Tier 3 countries in the form of removing non-humanitarian, non-
trade related foreign assistance. 148 The government will also vote against
and otherwise try to deny the Tier 3 countries non-humanitarian, non-
trade related assistance from international financial institutions, multilat-
eral development banks, and the International Monetary Fund.149 The
countries on the Tier 3 list have ninety days to bring themselves into com-
pliance, during which time the United States Trafficking in Persons Office
works closely with the government to help them achieve that goal. 150 The
TVPA gives the President the power to waive the economic sanctions if con-
tinued assistance is in the national interest of the United States' 5 1 or if a
waiver is necessary to protect vulnerable populations, including women
and children.15 2
The desirability of unilateral sanctions to enforce a U.S. federal law is
a hotly debated issue. 15 3 Similarly, there is disagreement about the effi-
cacy of the TVPA sanctions.' 5 4 Despite the debate over the sanctions sys-
144. In the interim between the writing and publication of this Note, the State Depart-
ment released the 2009 TIP Report. This Note, however, does not include the contents of
the 2009 Report. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2009), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123357.pdf [hereinafter Tip REPORT
2009].
145. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 44.
146. Id. passim.
147. Id. at 10.
148. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386 § 110(d)(1), 114 Stat. 1464, 1483.
149. Id. §§ 103(7), 1 10(d)(1)(B) (excluding from the definition of non-humanitarian,
non-trade related assistance: narcotics-related assistance, disaster relief assistance,
antiterrorism assistance, assistance for refugees, or assistance for humanitarian and
development programs).
150. See Chuang, supra note 19, at 454.
151. TVPA § 110(d)(4), 114 Stat. 1464, 1483.
152. Id. § 110(d)(5).
153. See Chuang, supra note 19, at 456-57 (proposing moral and legal objections to
the TVPA sanctions because the United States is promoting norms to which it is not also
legally bound and arguing that the sanctions undermine enforcement of international
human rights law). But see Cleveland, supra note 17, at 7 (arguing that unilateral sanc-
tions contribute to domestic internalization by "incorporating attention to human rights
concerns into the political processes of the sanctioning state").
154. See Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Updating the Domestic and International Impact of the
U.S. Victims of Trafficking Protection Act of 2000: Does Law Deter Crime?, 38 CASE W. RES.
J. INr'L L. 249, 268 (2006-2007) (suggesting that at least some states have taken imme-
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tem, the above-mentioned TVPRA 2008 amendment would, in theory,
allow for more sanctions; countries moved down to Tier 3 due to their pres-
ence on the Tier 2 Watch List for two years would then be subject to
sanctions.' 55
III. Human Trafficking in Emerging Markets: A Closer Look at India
and China
Trafficking of women and children across Asia has been described as
the "largest slave trade in history."' 51 6 India and China are both on the
2008 Tier 2 Watch List.' 5 7 India has been on the list for five years, consist-
ently since 2004, and China has been on the list for four years, consistently
since 2005.158
A. Human Trafficking in India
India is a source, destination, and transit country for victims of
human trafficking, especially bonded labor. 159 Human trafficking affects
an estimated twenty to sixty-five million Indians. 160 While internal forced
labor is the largest human trafficking problem in India, the country also is
plagued by international trafficking in persons.16 1 There is a booming
industry in India for women and girls trafficked into the country, often
from neighboring Nepal, and sexually exploited or sold into forced mar-
riage. 16 2 There is also a prevalence of trafficking children into India for
forced labor, begging, or for use as child soldiers by terrorist groups, 16 3
and many Nepali children are subjected to forced labor in circus shows. 16 4
For example, a case study of the neighborhood of Kamathipura, which
is the red light district of Bombay, revealed the widespread practice of forc-
ing young women to engage in commercial sex because of "debt bond-
age."'165 Even though prostitution is outlawed in India, there are "carefully
maintained arrangements between the police and the gharwali, who man-
age the brothels."'166 Weekly bribes to the police are called hafta, the Hindi
diate steps to move out of the Tier 3 status after being placed there in the TIP Report).
But see Meril Eugene Anthes, Jr., Chester James Taylor 2005 Grand Prize Winner: Regard-
ing Women & Children: Using International Trade Relations to Stem the Growing Tide of the
Sexual Exploitation of Women and Children, CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L. J., Summer 2005, at
69, 69 (suggesting that the TVPA is internationally ineffective).
155. TVPRA 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457 §107, 122 Stat. 5044.
156. Asia's Sex Trade is 'Slavery,' BBC NEWS, Feb. 20, 2003, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2783655.stm.
157. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 92, 139.
158. Id. Both continue to be on the Tier 2 Watch List on the recently published 2009
Tip Report. Tip REPORT 2009, supra note 144, at 105, 156.
159. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 139.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see DEWEY, supra note 26, at 133.
163. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 139.
164. Id. at 139; see DEWEY, supra note 26, at 133.
165. DEWEY, supra note 26, at 132.
166. Id. at 133.
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word for "week," and they ensure that the police allow the illegal sex indus-
try to function. 16 7 In Goa, an Indian state known for attracting tourism,
the trafficking is more clandestine, but it still exists. 168 It has garnered a
reputation for being a destination for pedophiles from Western Europe.1 6 9
Just like in Kamathipura, the police in Goa are often bribed and become
complicit in the trafficking. 170
Human trafficking is prohibited in India by Article 23 of the Indian
Constitution, and, under Article 21, Indians are guaranteed a right to life
and personal liberty. 17 1 The Indian government also promulgated the Sup-
pression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, as amended in
1978, and amended and renamed as the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act
(the ITP Act) in 1986.172 The ITP Act prohibits prostitution, but does not
make prostitution a legal offense, per se. 173 Instead, the ITP Act declares
other acts required to carry out prostitution illegal, such as maintaining a
brothel or living off of earnings procured by prostitution. 174 It holds a
person guilty of consorting with prostitutes if the person engages in sex
acts with a sex worker within 200 yards of a public place. 175 The Act pro-
vides for the detainment and reform of female offenders in correctional
institutions. ' 7
6
As India's only central anti-trafficking legislation, the ITP Act is
extremely problematic and is unable to address adequately the magnitude
of the human trafficking in the country. 177 The ITP Act is the only legisla-
tion that India has promulgated that deals directly with the issue of traf-
ficking in human beings, but it fails even to define what the term "human
trafficking" means. 17 8 The Act does not create an adequate system of pun-
ishment for the clients in cases of forced prostitution and has no clear plan
for bringing traffickers to justice. 179 Despite abundant research showing
that a majority of those involved in prostitution in India were brought into
prostitution as children, the ITP Act fails to address children as a separate
category or provide for any special treatment of rescued children.' 8 0
167. Id. at 131.
168. Id. at 134.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 135.
171. INDIA CONST. art. 23; HumAN RIGHTS LAW NETWORK, TRAFFICKING & THE LAW 33
(2006) [hereinafter TRAFFICKING & THE LAW].
172. The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, No. 104,
Acts of Parliament, 1957 [hereinafter ITP Act]; The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in
Women and Girls (Amendment) Act, 1978, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 1979; The Sup-
pression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls (Amendment) Act, 1986, No. 44, Acts
of Parliament, 1987; TRAFFICKING & THE LAW, supra note 171, at 83.
173. ITP Act; TRAFFICKING & THE LAW, supra note 171, at 49.
174. ITP Act §§ 3, 4; TRAFFICKING & THE LAW, supra note 171, at 53.
175. ITP Act § 7.
176. Id. § 21; TRAFFICKING & THE LAW, supra note 171, at 54.
177. TRAFFICKING & THE LAW, supra note 171, at 83.
178. ITP Act § 2; TRAFFICKING & THE LAw, supra note 171, at 34.
179. TRAFFICKING & THE LAw, supra note 171, at 54.
180. Id. at 55 (citing statistics from the Mahajan Committee Report finding that sixty
percent of persons found in prostitution were brought into it as children and that in
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In addition to the ITP Act, which addresses human trafficking directly,
the Indian government has promulgated national legislation that deals
with the problem indirectly. 18 1 For example, the Indian Penal Code
criminalizes the sale of minors for prostitution, and the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, provides for the protection of
children, including those children that are vulnerable to trafficking.
18 2
There are also several state and regional measures that address the human
trafficking problem in India. 183 Regionally, the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation's (SAARC) Convention on Preventing and Com-
bating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution in 2002 was
adopted to prevent and suppress trafficking in women and children for
prostitution and to protect victims.184 The SAARC Convention is criticized
for focusing solely on commercial sexual exploitation, ignoring the broader
problem of human trafficking, and lacking clarity in the rights of the vic-
tims and in government accountability.18 5
The measures taken by the Indian government, therefore, have all
proven to be inadequate. The U.S. State Department placed India on the
Tier 2 Watch List in 2008, its fifth consecutive year on the list, because it
failed to show increased efforts in combating human trafficking from the
prior year.' 8 6 It found that the Indian government makes uneven efforts to
prosecute traffickers and protect victims. 18 7 It stated that the "lack of sig-
nificant federal government action to address bonded labor, the reported
complicity of some law enforcement officials in trafficking and related
criminal activity, and the critical need for an effective national-level law
enforcement authority impeded India's ability to effectively combat its traf-
ficking in person problem."'18 8
B. Human Trafficking in China
China also is a source, transit, and destination country for human traf-
ficking. 18 9 According to a 2002 UNICEF estimate, China is home to
metropolitan areas, more that seventy-five percent of those found in prostitution were
under the age of twenty).
181. Id. at 33 (stating that the Indian Penal Code, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protec-
tion of Children) Act 2000, Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986, Child
Marriage Restraint Act 1929, Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 all attempt to
address the issue indirectly).
182. INDIA PEN. CODE § 372; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 § 2(d)(vii).
183. See TRAFFICKING & THE LAW, supra note 171, at 34 (describing acts in Indian
States to address trafficking for prostitution and trafficking in children).
184. SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION, CONvENTION ON PREvENT-
ING AND COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN FOR PROSTITUTION (2002),
available at http://www.humantrafficking.org/uploads/publications/SAARCConven-
tion onTrafficking___Prostitution.pdf.
185. TRAFFICKING & THE LAW, supra note 171, at 82.
186. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 139.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 91-92.
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approximately 250,000 victims of human trafficking.190 There is a signifi-
cant internal trafficking problem in China, as well as considerable interna-
tional trafficking of Chinese citizens to other countries. 191 Additionally,
many North Korean citizens voluntarily cross the border into China look-
ing for a better life.1 92 When they arrive in the country, undocumented
and vulnerable, they are often sold into commercial sexual exploitation,
forced marriage, or forced labor. 193 According to some theorists, China's
trafficking problems are compounded by its "one child per couple" policy,
which causes mass gendercide of female babies and increases the demand
for women to be trafficked into the country for marriage. 194 This traffick-
ing for the bridal market in China's poorer areas and for prostitution in
metropolitan areas increasingly is linked to organized crime. 195 Forced
labor is also a very large problem in China, especially in regard to traf-
ficked children. 196
The Chinese government publicly has acknowledged the human traf-
ficking problem, and there are laws in place to combat it, including China's
Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women and Article 240 of
the Criminal Code. 197 Article 240 of the Criminal Code of China provides
penalties for traffickers, including the possibility of the death penalty for
particularly serious circumstances.' 9 8 In its Law on the Protection of
Rights and Interests of Women, the Chinese Government prohibits the
abduction and trafficking of women and requires government departments
to rescue trafficked women and guard them against discrimination.' 99
Additionally, during the 2007-2008 reporting year, the Chinese govern-
ment established the Office for Preventing and Combating Crimes of Traf-
ficking in Women and Children and released a National Action Plan to
Combat Trafficking. 20 0 Under this plan there is now an appointed coordi-
nator of the government's anti-trafficking efforts and there are responsibili-
190. Combating Human Trafficking in China, supra note 25, at 1 (statement of Sen.
Chuck Hagel, Chairman, Cong.-Exec. Commission on China).
191. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 91.
192. Id. at 92.
193. Id.
194. See Combating Human Trafficking in China, supra note 25, at 6 (statement of Hon.
Christopher H. Smith, A U.S. Rep. from NJ.).
195. CRIMINAL CODE, art. 240 (P.R.C.); Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests
of Women (P.R.C) (1992), available at http://www.womenofchina.cn/PoliciesLaws/
Laws Regulations/1466.jsp; see also Combating Human Trafficking in China, supra note
25, at 1 (statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, Chairman, Cong.-Exec. Commission on
China).
196. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 92; see also Chinese Children Sold "Like Cabbages"
into Slavery, REuTERs, April 29, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsone/idUS-
PEK27749620080429 (describing the large scope of the problem of forced labor of poor
farmers, children, and mentally disabled people in kilns located in mines).
197. Combating Human Trafficking in China, supra note 25, at 1 (statement of Hon.
Chuck Hagel, Chairman, Cong.-Exec. Commission on China).
198. CRIMINAL CODE (P.R.C.), art. 240.
199. Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women (P.R.C.), supra note
195, art. 36.
200. China National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Chil-
dren (2008-2012) (issued by the State Council of China, Dec. 13, 2007), available at
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ties meted out to twenty-eight ministries for the purpose of combating
human trafficking.20
1
Even though the Chinese government is making efforts to eliminate
trafficking, its response still is inadequate. China punishes individuals for
acts that were committed as a result of trafficking, such as prostitution, and
deports North Korean trafficking victims back to horrible conditions. 2
0 2
China's anti-trafficking laws also do not properly cover forced labor.20 3 In
terms of protection, China has not created a system for referring victims of
trafficking to places that provide shelter and care.20 4 The new measures
implemented in the last year do not allocate resources to local governments
to facilitate implementation, and they still fail to include forms of traffick-
ing beyond the sexual exploitation of women and children. 20 5
Recent cases in which child trafficking victims have been rescued pro-
vide an example of the severe problems China faces when attempting to
implement anti-trafficking programs. Some children rescued from human
trafficking are taken to protection centers in Urumqi, the capital of the
Xinjiang region of China.20 6 While this seems to be a step in the right
direction under the protection prong of the TVPA, the lack of proper over-
sight has caused many of these rescues to be incomplete.20 7 The children
in the protection centers are released when an individual claiming to be a
family member comes for them, but it often turns out that the child is
released to a trafficker posing as a family member.20 8
The fight against human trafficking in China is also plagued by cor-
ruption and complicity within the local governments and by the overall
lack of transparency in the Chinese government. 20 9 Corrupt law enforce-
ment and government officials often are bribed by pimps and traffick-
ers. 2 10 Even where officials are not directly bribed by those involved in
human trafficking, the situation is often ignored as an embarrassment to
the Communist Party, a government system that is proud of its ability to
cure social problems. 2
11
Due to these problems with the Chinese government's response to the
trafficking problem, the U.S. State Department placed China on the Tier 2
http://www.humantrafficking.org/publications/612; see also TIP REPORT, supra note 2,
at 92.
201. China National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Chil-
dren (2008-2012), supra note 200, at 4.
202. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 91-92.
203. Combating Human Trafficking in China, supra note 25, at 10 (statement of Hon.
John R. Miller, Ambassador-at-Large and Director, Office to Monitor and Combat Traf-
ficking in Persons, U.S. Dep't of State).
204. Id. at 39 (prepared statement of Hon. John R. Miller).
205. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 92.
206. Id. at 30.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 92.
210. Emily E. Schuckman, Antitrafficking Policies in Asia and the Russian Far East: A
Comparative Perspective, 14 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 85, 89 (2006).
211. Id.
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Watch List for the fourth consecutive year in the 2008 TIP Report. 2 12 The
Report stated that China failed to improve from the past year in punish-
ment of traffickers and protection of victims.
2 13
IV. Why is the TVPA Ineffective in Emerging Markets like India and
China?
The problem of enforcement is one that often arises in international
law; in many cases,"observance must depend more heavily on ... extra-
legal sanctions" than on actual enforcement. 2 14 The TVPA relies on two
forms of extra-legal sanctions: (1) naming and shaming with the Tier Place-
ment system, 2 15 and (2) economic penalties in the form of sanctions on
non-humanitarian, non-trade related foreign assistance.2 16 As illustrated
in the above discussion of the continuing problems in India and China, the
traditional threat of economic sanctions and reliance on naming and sham-
ing are not always successful in influencing noncompliant countries to
change their behavior. This Note argues that the failure of traditional extra-
legal sanctions as enforcement mechanisms is based on the delicate rela-
tionships that the United States must maintain with emerging markets
such as India and China and the United States' hesitance to apply sanc-
tions to those countries.
A. The Failure of Traditional Naming and Shaming: Problems with the
Tier System
Often in international law, the group designated to monitor obser-
vance of a certain law relies on the ability to publish violators' lack of
observance, thereby shaming them into compliance. 2 17 The idea is that,
where there is a widely held norm, like the norm against slavery, and a
monitoring body can highlight the fact that a country violated this widely
held norm, the rest of the international community collectively will con-
demn that violator's actions. 2 18 The international community's stigmatiza-
tion of that violating country will encourage that country to alter its
behavior, as well as discourage other countries from violating the same
norm.2 19 Using this kind of naming and shaming to encourage a country
to change its behavior requires that the country express concern over its
212. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 92.
213. Id.
214. Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, 42-44, 88-90, 93 (2d ed. 1979), in JEFFREY L.
DUNOFF, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 1035 (2006).
215. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386 § 110, 114 Stat. 1464, 1482.
216. Id. § 110(d)(1).
217. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.
J. 1935, 1951-52 (2002) (discussing the institutionalist theory of compliance that views
reputation as the "primary anchor of compliance for all but those countries for which
compliance is costless"); see also Cleveland, supra note 17, at 3.
218. Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses,
and Norm Entrepreneurship: the Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban
Treaty, 20 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 561, 566 (2003).
219. Id. at 566-67.
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reputation, which many countries do, and that there is a widespread
acceptance of the norm that was violated.2 20
Naming and shaming has proven successful in other areas of human
rights, such as with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICBL). 2 2 1 The ICBL was able to motivate change in landmine use by rais-
ing awareness of landmine issues with the help of non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), and then using that awareness to create a direct
campaign of stigmatization and shaming for the countries and companies
involved in land mine use and trade. 22 2 The campaign was successful in
persuading a global audience to change their behavior and their regard for
other countries involved in landmine use. 2 23 This kind of model has been
suggested for many other agendas, such as outlawing child soldiers or
shaming countries into more responsible environmental standards.2 24
One of the requirements to make such a system work is that the monitoring
body must deploy shame effectively against the norm violators. 22 5
There are, however, arguments that naming and shaming is decreasing
in efficacy, particularly in countries with increasing economic growth.2 26
The circumstances in India and China support that proposition, as the
consistent naming and shaming of those countries for many years has not
been successful in influencing them to bring themselves within the mini-
mum standards required by the TVPA.2 27 Some critics argue that with the
rise in states' sophistication about their images, pure reputational sanc-
tions are no longer effective. 228 Additionally, the results of the only large-
scale econometric analysis of the success of naming and shaming were not
encouraging.2 29 This enforcement mechanism has been particularly inef-
fective in countries like China and India, where rapid economic growth has
caused increased competition for raw materials. 2 30 This competition
makes it very difficult for wealthy states to ignore states with an abundance
of natural resources, regardless of the human rights abuses taking place in
220. Id. at 567; see also Henkin, supra note 214, at 1036 (stating that naming and
shaming rests on the idea that "law observance will depend ... on the law's current
acceptability and on the community's-especially the victim's-current interest in vindi-
cating it").
221. Wexler, supra note 218, at 568.
222. See id. at 569-72
223. See id. at 572-75.
224. See id. at 581.
225. See id.
226. Patrick Keenan, Financial Globalization and Human Rights, 46 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 509, 556 (2008) (citing a study that found there is "'strong evidence to show
that export-led economies with a high degree of export flows may be more likely to
repress human rights"').
227. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 91-92, 139.
228. See Keenan, supra note 226, at 26.
229. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the
Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 691-92, 713 (2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.princeton.edu/-ehafner/pdfs/sticks-stones.pdf (analyzing the
relationship between naming and shaming and government human rights practices for
145 countries from 1972 to 2000).
230. Keenan, supra note 226, at 3.
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the country.2 3 1 Also, even when the U.S. government sanctions a country
for violating human rights norms, there is often still the capital mobility for
U.S. companies to put money into the sanctioned country in search of a
profit.2 32 Therefore, countries with deplorable human rights track records
can still attract investment and development assistance from private com-
panies while they are being sanctioned by the government. 233
B. Why the Unilateral Sanctions Have No Real Teeth
The other form of enforcement used by the United States in the TVPA
is sanctions on non-humanitarian, non-trade related foreign assistance.2 3 4
These unilateral sanctions, which are imposed without authorization by
agreement between the member countries, are a common mechanism to
encourage states to comply with international law and norms. 235 The
United States has had success using this tactic in many different areas, and
it serves the purposes of punishing the violating country and improving
future compliance. 23 6 The hope is that economic sanctions promote
respect for human rights and modify behavior by helping states to internal-
ize certain norms, 23 7 in addition to serving punishment and deterrent
functions. 238 There are proponents of the idea that unilateral sanctions by
the United States that are "consistent with international law and that pro-
mote recognized human rights standards play an important and legitimate
part in [the] transnational legal process and the promulgation and internal-
ization of fundamental human rights."2 39
There are, however, many potential problems with the use of unilateral
sanctions and with the United States' deployment of them as an enforce-
ment mechanism for the TVPA. First of all, there is the issue of whether the
United States has jurisdiction to impose unilateral sanctions and whether
imposing them violates state sovereignty. 240 Many critics feel that the use
of unilateral sanctions by the United States displays the "hegemonic
actions of a global 'hyperpower,' which violate state sovereignty and the
principles of the U.N. system. '24 1 While the United Nations Charter and
customary international law do not bar unilateral economic sanctions,
there is the question of whether the United States is bypassing multilateral
enforcement mechanisms and enforcing rules to which it does not itself
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386 § 110, 114 Stat. 1464, 1483.
235. Cleveland, supra note 17, at 4.
236. Id. at 5 (discussing the use of unilateral sanctions by the United States to deal
with human and labor rights standards, as well as to target specific abusing countries).
237. According to Harold Koh, norm internationalization is "the process by which
nations incorporate international law concepts in their domestic practice. Harold
Hongju Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997).
238. Cleveland, supra note 17, at 6.
239. Id. at 7.
240. Id. at 48-49.
241. Id. at 48.
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have to submit.24 2 In dealing with these critiques it is important to note
that the economic sanction employed by the United States in regards to the
TVPA is the withdrawal of assistance that was voluntarily given by the
United States in the first place.24 3 Even so, critics feel that the United
States uses its sanctioning power to "selectively and hypocritically enforce
human and labor rights," by enforcing its own human rights standards
instead of international standards.2 44
Furthermore, there are doubts about the effectiveness of sanctions. 245
Many critics feel that when the United States uses economic sanctions, it is
the innocent population of the sanctioned country that suffers instead of
the government that the United States is attempting to influence. 24 6 All
unilateral economic sanctions by the United States are subject to presiden-
tial waiver "based on a finding that certain circumstances exist, such as
improved human rights conditions, 'extraordinary circumstances,' or sim-
ply a finding that waiver is in the U.S. national security interests. '2 47 Crit-
ics of the sanctions say that instead of issuing blanket sanctions based on
behavior, the United States picks and chooses which countries to sanction,
ignoring ones that are strategically important to the United States, like
China.248 They claim that the United States targets countries it already
sanctions for other reasons, like Cuba and Iran, or those in which the
United States has little economic strategy, like Burma and Haiti.24 9 Out of
the fourteen countries on the Tier 3 List in the 2008 TIP Report, former
President George W. Bush only fully sanctioned Burma, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Syria, Cuba and Iran, with partial waiv-
ers for DPRK and Iran. 25 0 Additionally, as only Tier 3 countries can be
sanctioned, there has been some debate over whether countries that should
be placed in Tier 3 are instead placed in Tier 2 to fit United States' inter-
ests. 25 1 For example, in 2007, when India was placed on the Tier 2 Watch
List instead of the Tier 3 list, CNN reported that there was a heated debate
between former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Deputy
Secretary of State John Negroponte in which Rice overruled Negroponte's
wish to place them on the Tier 3 list due to "concern about alienating the
242. Chuang, supra note 19, at 458; Cleveland supra note 17, at 56, 69.
243. Cleveland supra note 17, at 56, 69
244. Id.
245. Chuang, supra note 19, at 459.
246. Id.
247. Cleveland, supra note 17, at 36.
248. Id. at 75.
249. See REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 8, at 34; Cleve-
land, supra note 17, at 75.
250. Memorandum from the Office of the Press Secretary to the Secretary of State,
Presidential Determination with Respect to Foreign Governments' Efforts Regarding
Trafficking in Persons (Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/
prsrl/08/111083.htm.
251. See Elise Labott & Zane Verjee, India Escapes U.S. List of Worst Human Traffick-
ers, CNN NEws, June 13, 2007, available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/06/12/
human.trafficking/index.html.
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Indian government. '25 2 The Indian and Chinese governments' knowledge
that there is such a small chance that sanctions would ever be used against
them could negatively impact the efficacy of the sanctions as enforcement
tools. 2 5
3
C. Exploring Possible Solutions
To deal with the problems of compliance in India and China, the
United States should amend the TVPA and its enforcement regime. This
Note proposes that there are many possible solutions to deal with the prob-
lem of enforcement in emerging markets, including a narrower waiver pro-
vision for economic sanctions, 254 clearer standards for tier placement,
creation of a new regime for shaming noncompliant counties, 25 5 a focus on
victim protection, or more U.S. support for the Palermo Protocol and the
institution of a central international monitoring agency for human traffick-
ing.256 While there are many possible solutions, this Note argues that, at
the present time, the most practical solution for effecting change in India
and China with regard to their human trafficking problems is to revamp
the naming and shaming system.
While there is a lot of criticism of the TVPA, until the Palermo Proto-
col is able to adequately enforce human trafficking norms, unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions and reputational enforcement through the TVPA are
necessary enforcement tools. The United States should support interna-
tional cooperation and work toward effective enforcement of the Palermo
Protocol, but for the present time, some amendments will help the TVPA
fill the gap. The changes suggested here attempt to address some of the
criticisms of the TVPA, such as applying sanctions more evenly and mak-
ing clearer standards for the tier system to avoid the criticism of favorable
treatment for economically powerful countries. The main function of the
sanctions and tier system, however, should remain in place until the
Palermo Protocol is improved because the TVPA currently is the best inter-
national watchdog to monitor and fight against human trafficking.
1. Strengthening the Sanctions Regime
Because the failure of the United States to apply sanctions in an even
252. Id. Additionally, Mark Lagon, ambassador at large for the Trafficking in Persons
Office said, "'I would be perpetuating a fraud to say that we don't look at multiple
factors in our relationship with countries any time we take a step on a particular issue
like human trafficking."' Id.
253. See Anthes, supra note 154, at 69 (noting that a senior congressional aide said,
"[W]e all know that [cutting of aid] is never going to happen" and that U.S. laws with
this enforcement mechanism have little effect on the rest of the world).
254. To address critics' concerns that the United States selectively chooses which
countries to sanction based on economic interests see Cleveland, supra note 17, at 75.
255. Based on theorists' claims that naming and shaming is not effective when used
on countries that are emerging markets. See Keenan, supra note 226, at 3.
256. To address critics' arguments that the United States is infringing on state sover-
eignty with the TVPA see Cleveland, supra note 17, at 48, 69.
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manner is so detrimental to the sanctions regime, 25 7 arguably allowing
emerging markets like India and China to escape punishment, 25 8 institut-
ing a narrower waiver provision in the TVPA would help to strengthen
sanctions as an enforcement tool. Congress could address the problem by
amending the TVPA to have a narrower waiver provision or to include
mandatory sanctions. When examining the U.S. unilateral sanctions
regime in general, one scholar suggested that when Congress includes
broad waiver provisions into statutes, it invites executives "with competing
priorities to refuse to impose sanctions on countries that would otherwise
qualify.25 9 Therefore, something much less broad than that a mere
"national interest" is needed to waive sanctions to countries on the Tier 3
List,260 which would make it more difficult for China and India to slide
under the radar for political and economic reasons. 261 Note, however, that
this is not to say that Congress can force the President to impose economic
sanctions; instead, Congress would narrow the scope of the provision of
the legislation that gives the President waiver authority over the sanctions
imposed by Congress, hopefully reducing the amount of Presidential
waivers.
It is not clear, however, that the institution of a narrower waiver provi-
sion would be strong enough in effect.262 Even with a much narrower
waiver provision, "[gireater specificity of language, may not always con-
strain executive discretion." 263 It is possible that the President would con-
tinue to waive sanctions even with a narrower and more specific waiver
provision in the legislation. 264 This problem could, in theory, be
addressed by a mandatory sanctions regime. 265 While the president may
feel politically compelled to waive sanctions for India and China due to
their economic impact on the United States, 266 mandatory sanctions could
"provide political leverage for the President in his efforts to urge compli-
ance with fundamental rights by foreign states, by allowing him to argue
that his hands have been tied by Congress."267 The sanctions would then
be implemented to every violating country, regardless of their economic
ties to the United States. This knowledge that the sanctions are more than
257. Id. at 75 (arguing that "hypocrisy in the imposition of sanctions has done the
most to undermine the normative legitimacy of U.S. unilateral sanctions").
258. See id.
259. Id. at 80.
260. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386 § 110, 114 Stat. 1464, 1483.
261. See Cleveland, supra note 17, at 75 (arguing that some countries are spared eco-
nomic sanctions for economic reasons).
262. Id. at 80.
263. Id.
264. See id. (showing that President Clinton continued to exercise the waiver provi-
sion of the Helms-Burton Act even where the language of the provision was specific).
265. See id. at 85.
266. See id. at 75 (arguing that Presidents do not sanction countries that are economi-
cally important to the United States and quoting former presidential hopeful Pat
Buchanan's criticism of the Clinton administration that "[Clinton] blockaded, starved
and invaded tiny Haiti for human rights violations, but he proudly chaperone[d] China
in the WTO.")
267. Id. at 84.
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a mere threat would likely encourage those countries to modify their
behavior.26 8
The problem here is that Congress is reluctant, understandably, to
remove that discretion from the hands of the President, and even if Con-
gress did remove the waiver provision, the President has other means to
refrain from imposing sanctions.2 69 For example, Congress passed provi-
sions for mandatory sanctions to be imposed for violations of the Interna-
tional Whaling Convention.2 70 Japan clearly violated the Convention, but
the Reagan Administration still avoided imposing the sanctions by declin-
ing to find that Japan violated the Convention, and the Supreme Court
deferred to the executive branch's determination. 27 1
It seems that, while theoretically less effective, narrowing the waiver
provision is a more viable option for Congress. Because removing the
waiver provision altogether is unlikely to be something that Congress is
comfortable doing and because it has not been shown to be the perfect
solution in the past,2 72 amending the TVPA to have a narrower waiver pro-
vision is likely the most practical option to improve the sanctions regime.
Perhaps drawing public attention to what the actual waiver provision says
and what the President decides to do would bring the attention of voters to
the issue, thereby democratically influencing the President to stay within
the bounds of the provision.
There are, however, still many concerns that accompany the idea of
trying to effect change in India and China through sanctions at all. For
example, the Clinton Administration thought that imposing sanctions in
this context went against the cooperative nature of the Palermo Protocol
and would prove to be "profoundly counterproductive. ' 27 3 It feared that
instituting sanctions would cause countries to be less transparent about the
human trafficking problems within their borders. 274 There is also the pos-
sibility that sanctions can have an opposite result from what was intended,
"by further radicalizing recalcitrant regimes and, moreover, fostering
regional discontent with the United States."275 Many critics of sanctions
also worry that the people that actually feel the economic pressure are the
innocent citizens of a country and not the perpetrators of the crime. 27 6
For example, economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. government in Vene-
zuela placed many programs at risk, including those with motives such as
providing cleaner drinking water and protecting the Amazon rainforest.
27 7
268. Id. at 7 (arguing that unilateral sanctions contribute to norm internalization).
269. Id. at 80.
270. Id. at 83.
271. Id.
272. See id. (arguing that the case of Japan and the mandatory sanctions violations of
the International Whaling Convention shows that mandatory sanctions have not been
the perfect solution).
273. Chuang, supra note 19, at 455.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 487.
276. Id. at 459.
277. Id. at 487-88
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Additionally, while imposing sanctions may improve enforcement of
the TVPA, it also poses some economic risks to the United States. In 2008,
the United States imported $363,551.7 million in goods from China and
India while exporting $90,123.6 million in goods and services to those
countries. 2 78 Imposing sanctions could disrupt this profitable exchange
and generate some ill will toward the United States from those countries.
As mentioned above, without mandatory sanctions, this may sway the Pres-
ident's decision as to whether a country should face punishment.2 79
While it might be somewhat detrimental to the United States economically
to employ sanctions on non-humanitarian, non-trade related foreign assis-
tance to China and India because of U.S. reliance on trade with those coun-
tries,280 freedom from forced slavery and abuse is a right so fundamental
that it cannot be properly evaluated in terms of a cost-benefit analysis.
This is not simply an issue of cost to the United States.
But even ignoring the potential financial harm to the United States,
there are many issues with using unilateral sanctions to enforce the TVPA.
While focusing on improving economic sanctions is a possible solution for
dealing with human trafficking problems in India and China, the non-eco-
nomic concerns of possibly causing a backlash or harming the innocent
populations and the dubious efficacy of these kinds of sanctions, make this
a less than ideal solution.
2. TVPRA 2008 and Sanctions
Another idea to improve the efficacy of the TVPA recently was imple-
mented through the TVPRA 2008. As noted above, the provision states that
countries that have been on the Tier 2 Watch list for two consecutive years
will be moved to the Tier 3 list, which allows them to be sanctioned by the
U.S. government.28 l The President may, however, waive application of the
provision for up to two years if he finds that the country in question has a
plan to make "significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking,"28 2 the actions in
the plan would constitute significant efforts if the plan was implemented,
and the country "is devoting sufficient resources to implement the
plan."28 3 Because this new law does not take effect until the 2009 TIP
Report, it will take several years to determine its effectiveness. While this is
certainly a step in the right direction of holding countries accountable,
there may be problems inherent in the waiver provision. The provision
may not prove effective because it can be waived through a mere showing
that there is a plan, and does not actually require significant efforts to be
278. See U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS, available at http://www.cen-
sus.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2008 (P.R.C.) and http://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/balance/c5330.html#2008 (India).
279. See Cleveland, supra note 17, at 75 (arguing that Presidents do not sanction
countries that are economically important to the United States).
280. Keenan, supra note 226, at 3.
281. TVPRA 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457 §107(a)(D)(i), 122 Stat. 5044.
282. Id. §107(a)(D)(ii)(I), 122 Stat. 5044.
283. Id. §107(a)(D)(ii)(I), 122 Stat. 5044.
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made at the time of the waiver. The same political pressures will still exist
with the discretion to categorize economically powerful countries; now the
discretion just exists at two levels in this situation: at the categorization
level first and then at the sanctions level if the country is actually moved to
Tier 3.284
3. Improving the Naming and Shaming System
To deal with the problem of countries like China and India that remain
unwilling to take the necessary steps to combat human trafficking, the
United States should improve the naming and shaming system.285 One of
the main problems with the tier system, and the sanctions that follow from
those tier rankings, is inconsistencies in application. 286 The TVPA should
be amended to articulate clearer standards for placing countries in one of
the three tiers. It is unclear what exactly a country must do to meet the
standard for Tier 1. There is no requirement that Tier 1 countries even
"distinguish between smuggling and trafficking"28 7 or "refrain from penal-
izing trafficked persons through arrest, incarceration, or summary depor-
tation. '288 This allows countries with severe trafficking problems to be
placed in the Tier 1 category and to duck reputational harm, while still
having grave human trafficking problems. Also, the explanations for why a
country is on one of the other tiers, especially on a tier in which sanctions
attach, should be more detailed. The standards for higher tier placement
should "describe the bases for condemnation clearly and in detail so as to
avoid allegations of bias."289 With more definite standards in the tier sys-
tem and more explanation in the TIP Report about the reasons why a coun-
try was placed on a particular tier, the amount of room for discretion based
on factors other than treatment of human trafficking in the country would
shrink. This would decrease the chance that India and China could escape
a Tier 3 ranking while they still inadequately address the huge human traf-
ficking industries that are thriving within their borders.
Traditional naming and shaming has not been entirely effective at
encouraging China and India to deal with their human trafficking
problems,290 but a new form of naming and shaming connected to the
economics of the countries might change that.2 9 1 Some scholars argue
that reputational sanctions must have some instrumental effect to be sali-
ent and have found that countries that received a lot of aid and those with
284. This harkens back to the above discussion of Condoleezza Rice arguing that
India should be placed on the Tier 2 Watch List instead of Tier 3 in an effort to appease
the Indian government. See supra Part IV.B.
285. Keenan, supra note 226, at 3 (arguing that reputations of states have become less
important).
286. Chuang, supra note 19, at 493.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See Keenan, supra note 226, at 3.
291. See id. at 46 (arguing in his article that the "international community should
develop mechanisms to systematize the creation of reputations and the implications of
having a particular reputation").
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more foreign investment were more responsive to shame.292 Louis Henkin
noted that, in the sphere of human rights, "if states do not act, sovereign
companies can be induced by shaming, by NGOs, the responsible press, by
stockholders, by consumers..." and other ways. 29 3 Another scholar sug-
gests that reputational harm is more effective if it affects the credit or coun-
try risk ratings, which are ratings that investors use to determine the risk
that their investment will fail due to the "failure of the host country to pay
its debts, enforce agreements, or maintain adequate control of its territory
of investing within a certain country or with a certain company." 29 4 States
and companies that seek to do international business are encouraged to
maintain good ratings because they are an important part of competition
in international business. 2 95 Therefore, the United States should amend
the TVPA to add a method of connecting the shaming of the countries to
decreased foreign investment, or it should find a way to shame individual
companies in the country. This would allow the shaming technique to
have a much larger impact.
One option for how Congress could amend the TVPA to include
reputational consequences that actually affect foreign investment would be
for the TVPA to impose its own risk rating system for corporations. 29 6 If a
corporation or government contractor is found to be using forced laborers,
is buying from manufactures that used trafficked labor, or is otherwise
working with such organizations, that information should be published. 29 7
Investors would be wary of investing in corporations or governments that
rely on human trafficking because of the reputational problems it would
cause to the investors when the information was published, and also
because it is economically risky to depend on a work force that could, at
any moment, be shut down if the workers are rescued.2 98 There is already
a U.S. law in place, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 22.17, which
authorizes the U.S. government "to terminate a contract or otherwise
penalize a contractor if the contractor engages in human trafficking." 299
This is a step in the right direction, but the idea should be expanded to
include contractors from other governments and foreign corporations.
While the United States government would not be able to directly punish
foreign corporations with no U.S. subsidiary or step in and force the termi-
292. Id. at 28.
293. Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, And Human Rights,
Et Cetera, 68 FoRDHAm L. REa. 1, 13 (1999-2000).
294. Keenan, supra note 226, at 49.
295. Id.
296. This would be in addition to the ratings already used in the Tier System. Id. at
50 (proposing the use of ratings similar to credit ratings to rate the human rights per-
formance of states and companies).
297. This is based on the second approach suggested by Keenan where NGOs and
others collect information about state and company behavior with regards to human
rights and disseminate that information. Id. at 51.
298. Id. at 49 (stating that "[i]nformation about the ability (an inclination) to honor
agreements is ... critical to any investment decision").
299. John G. Bradbury, Human Trafficking and Government Contractor Liability: Is
FAR 22.17 a Step in the Right Direction?, 37 PUB. CoNT. L. J. 907, 908 (2008).
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nation of the contracts, the publishing of that information would likely be
sufficient punishment to deter the behavior.30 0 Instead of harming the citi-
zens of countries with an economic sanction that removes aid previously
given by the United States, the economic loss here would be to large corpo-
rations and governments. 30 1 Corporations would likely try to avoid work-
ing with any kind of trafficked individuals and influence the government
to make harsher laws to deter that kind of work. Such a system does not
address commercial sex trafficking, but it would go a long way toward
stemming bonded labor.
4. Focusing on Protecting Victims of Trafficking
Another way that the TVPA should be changed to deal with problem
countries like India and China is to emphasize protection as well as prose-
cution.30 2 Both India and China, as noted above, have failed to adequately
protect victims of human trafficking. In India, the government fails to pro-
tect the victims of labor trafficking, and protects victims of sex trafficking
inconsistently.3 0 3 The victims are often returned to their home countries,
where they are stigmatized and subject to re-trafficking. 30 4 Likewise,
China has no government assistance programs to help victims of traffick-
ing, and the Chinese government continues to deport North Korean victims
back to North Korea where they often face severe punishment.30 5 In both
India and China, there have been reported problems of rescued child traf-
ficking victims being returned back to their traffickers due to a failure of
the government or law enforcement to follow procedures.3 0 6 If protection
of victims were viewed with the same kind of priority that prosecution is
under the TVPA, then China and India would likely have to be moved
down to Tier 3 due to the seriousness of each country's protection
problems.
5. Beyond the TVPA - Supporting the Palermo Protocol
Outside of the scope of the TVPA, the United States should try to
influence countries to become parties to the Palermo Protocol and to fol-
low those international standards instead of the standards under the
300. See Wexler, supra note 218, at 566-67 (stating that public stigmatization can
influence changes in behavior).
301. Responding to the argument that economic sanctions often punish the innocent
population of a country. Chuang, supra note 19, at 459.
302. Chac6n, supra note 7, at 3024-25 (saying that the TVPA "overemphasizes prose-
cution, while underemphasizing protection and prevention").
303. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 141.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 94.
306. Id. at 30 (describing a situation in India where a group of child sex trafficking
victims were released back to traffickers when the police failed to follow the procedures
in place and a situation in China where child victims were released from protection
centers and given to traffickers posing as family members).
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TVPA. 30 7 India has signed the Palermo Protocol, but has yet to ratify it,
and China has not even signed.30 8 Because there are so many parties to
the Protocol and it has garnered so much international support,30 9 it
might be an easier task to get India and China to implement those stan-
dards than the more stringent standards of the TVPA. Also, as one scholar
noted, it can be a positive economic move for a country to enter into a
human rights treaty. 3 10 She explains that affording human rights protec-
tion shows investors that a government "has a low discount rate and is
therefore less likely to engage in expropriation," thereby spurring eco-
nomic growth in the country.3 11 It might be possible to incentivize China
and India to join the Protocol through that economic reasoning.
Additionally, the United States should work to improve the Palermo
Protocol's ability to fight human trafficking. Most importantly, there must
be a central monitoring body for the Protocol to ensure that state parties
actually adhere to the Protocol's provisions. There are currently many
agencies that are working to fight against human trafficking.31 2 Some
scholars have recommended that a lead authority be designated to be the
head agency dealing with the human trafficking problem.3 13 This would
allow for more coordination and cooperation, and the roles and responsi-
bilities of different agencies would become more formalized.3 14 If the
United States could work with the United Nations to create a central
agency to oversee human trafficking, the United States likely could step
back from its criticized role as international watchdog and rely on the cen-
tral agency to do that work.
Conclusion
The scope and magnitude of the human trafficking epidemic is such
that it affects every country in our international community. This Note
focuses on the problems in India and China as examples of the particular
enforcement issues that arise when dealing with countries that are emerg-
ing global markets and, therefore, key to the United States' international
trade and business; but these are not the only countries that are failing to
meet the TVPA minimum standards or even the worst offenders in violat-
ing human trafficking standards.
The long-term goal should be for changes to the Palermo Protocol,
perhaps based on some of the provisions of the TVPA, and for the interna-
tional community to influence hold-out countries to become parties. An
307. To address the argument that U.S. efforts to impose its own law instead of the
Protocol is inappropriate as a matter of International Law see Chuang, supra note 19, at
493.
308. TIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 281.
309. There are 117 signatories and 124 parties to the Palermo Protocol. See List of
Signatories and Parties to the Palermo Protocol, supra note 72.
310. Hathaway, supra note 217, at 2012.
311. Id.
312. Edwards, supra note 92, at 50.
313. Id. at 51.
314. Id.
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international agency should be designated to be the lead monitoring body
of the amended Palermo Protocol, and all parties should be held accounta-
ble for their adherence through naming and shaming, economic sanctions,
and other enforcement mechanisms. With the global community behind
its enforcement, countries like China and India would be more likely to
comply. Additionally, this solution would avoid the jurisdictional issues
inherent in the use of U.S. law to impose standards on other countries.
Currently, the TVPA is the most effective and comprehensive system
for monitoring anti-human trafficking efforts internationally, and until
there is a suitable international body to take on that responsibility, the
United States should continue to monitor and enforce anti-trafficking stan-
dards. Therefore, while the TVPA continues in its watchdog role, it should
be changed to be more effective. The United States should revise the rank-
ing regime of the TVPA and institute sanctions in a more consistent man-
ner. Congress could address the problems in the sanctions regime by
amending the TVPA to have a narrower Presidential waiver provision or
removing the waiver provision altogether. Congress also could address the
problem by amending the TVPA to include clearer standards for what is
necessary for placement in each of the tiers. To deal with the ineffective-
ness of naming and shaming, the TVPA should include a ranking system of
corporations and countries so that reputational problems will directly
affect the foreign investment in a country's corporations and government.
Additionally, there should be changes to emphasize protection, instead of
focusing mainly on enforcement, as China and India are both enforcing
human trafficking laws but failing to protect victims, therefore perpetuat-
ing the human trafficking cycle.

